Tag: (E) relief

(1992) Various languages – Emotion concepts


Wierzbicka, Anna (1992). Defining emotion concepts. Cognitive Science, 16(4), 539-581. DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog1604_4

This article demonstrates that emotion concepts – including the so-called basic ones, such as anger or sadness – can be defined in terms of universal semantic primitives such as GOOD, BAD, DO, HAPPEN, KNOW, and WANT, in terms of which all areas of meaning, in all languages, can be rigorously and revealingly portrayed.

The definitions proposed here take the form of certain prototypical scripts or scenarios, formulated in terms of thoughts, wants, and feelings. These scripts, however, can be seen as formulas providing rigorous specifications of necessary and sufficient conditions (not for emotions as such, but for emotion concepts), and they do not support the idea that boundaries between emotion concepts are “fuzzy”. On the contrary, the small set of universal semantic primitives employed here (which has emerged from two decades of empirical investigations by the author and colleagues) demonstrates that even apparent synonyms such as sad and unhappy embody different – and fully specifiable – conceptual structures.


Research carried out by one or more experienced NSM practitioners

(1995) Dictionaries vs. encyclopedias


Wierzbicka, Anna (1995). Dictionaries vs. encyclopaedias: How to draw the line. In Philip W. Davis (Ed.), Alternative linguistics: Descriptive and theoretical modes (pp. 289-315). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

DOI: 10.1075/cilt.102.09wie

A more recent publication building on this one is chapter 11 (pp. 335-350) of:

Wierzbicka, Anna (1996). Semantics: Primes and universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abstract:

If by analysing language we find evidence suggesting that ‘linguistic knowledge’ differs somehow from ‘non-linguistic knowledge’, and that a distinction between the two can be drawn in a non-arbitrary way, this would support the view that the mind itself draws a distinction between a ‘mental dictionary’ and a ‘mental encyclopaedia’. This paper argues that this indeed is the case, and that by examining linguistic evidence we can indeed learn how to draw the line between ‘meaning’ and ‘knowledge’, or between ‘linguistic knowledge’ and ‘encyclopaedic knowledge’.


Research carried out by one or more experienced NSM practitioners