Tag: (E) games

(2006) NSM and cross-cultural understanding


Haser, Verena (2006). Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage and cross-cultural understanding. LAUD Working Papers, Series A, General and Theoretical Papers, 659. PDF (open access)

Wierzbicka’s work on semantic primitives (henceforth abbreviated as NSM) presents one of the most intriguing and significant theories in linguistic semantics. Many definitions proposed within this framework are unrivalled for the way they illuminate the meaning of words and allow us to tease apart closely related concepts. NSM theory is not limited to linguistic concerns; accepting Wierzbicka’s general line of thought has important implications for philosophical semantics. Furthermore, her theory is surely of central concern to scholars interested in linguistic psychology.

In this essay I attempt to raise some questions that are prompted by i) a comparison between Wierzbicka’s approach and certain ideas familiar from modern philosophy of language (especially philosophy by Wittgenstein and some major exponents of his work) and ii) a case study that puts to the test Wierzbicka’s definition of game (as proposed in her Semantics: Primes and Universals, 1996). The ultimate goal of this article is to invite some response by adherents of NSM which might provide a detailed answer to some of the issues and objections raised in this article. Being fascinated by some aspects of the NSM project while harbouring some doubts concerning its application and the arguments motivating the approach, I hope that my observations might indirectly offer a modest contribution to the framework.


Sound application of NSM principles carried out without prior training by an experienced NSM practitioner

(1992) Definitions


Wierzbicka, Anna (1992). Back to definitions: Cognition, semantics, and lexicography. Lexicographica, 8, 146-174.

DOI: 10.1515/9783110244120.146

A more recent publication building on this one is chapter 8 (pp. 237-257) of:

Wierzbicka, Anna (1996). Semantics: Primes and universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abstract:

Different words mean different things; they make different contributions to the communicative acts humans engage in. The contributions made by different words can be compared if we have some standard of measure for describing their communicative potential (i.e., their meaning). As pointed out by Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and others, such a common measure can be found in a set of words regarded as conceptual primes. We can single out in any language a group of words in terms of which the meaning (that is, the communicative potential) of all other words in that language can be described and compared. On this view of language, semantic description makes sense and will indeed be illuminating if it is anchored in a set of conceptual primes linked with lexical indefinables, that is, words (or morphemes, or expressions) whose meaning is relatively clear and intelligible, and in terms of which all the other words in the lexicon can be characterized revealingly and accurately.

This paper argues that the distinction between definable and indefinable concepts (and words) must be the cornerstone of any fruitful and linguistically relevant theory of definitions. It shows that meanings can be rigorously described and compared if they are recognized for what they are: unique and culture-specific configurations of universal semantic primitives.


Research carried out by one or more experienced NSM practitioners